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CONTRACTING FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS: SIDESTEPPING THE
FAA WEAKENS ARBITRATION VIABILITY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Arbitration agreements play an important role in our increasingly litigious society.' Arbitration offers a convenient and expeditious resolution
to conflicts between parties that may otherwise result in costly, timeconsuming litigation. 2 In order to govern such agreements, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA" or "Act") in 1925, which listed
the duties of an arbitrator, the acceptable boundaries of such agreements,
and the scope of judicial review.3 The United States Supreme Court has
interpreted the FAA broadly, recognizing the importance of judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements. 4 The Supreme Court's treatment of
the FAA reinforces Congress' intent in passing the Act.5 Both the Supreme Court and Congress have confirmed that when parties, acting in
good faith, contract to settle disputes without traditional litigation, such
contracts are valid, binding, and enforceable. 6
Despite strong federal support, the future of arbitration agreements
still remains a hotly debated issue.7 An important element of arbitration is
that the arbitrator's final determination is binding and non-appealable.8

1 See

Leo Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest: the

ArbitrationExperience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1987).
2 See Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?,
39 HARv. J. ON LEGiS. 281, 284-85 (2002) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (1925)). This
article states that Congress' dual intent in passing the FAA was first, to encourage costsaving arbitration, and second, to combat judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements. See id.
3 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15 (2002).
4 See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 474 (1989) (noting FAA enacted to overcome judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration
agreements).
5 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
6 See supra notes 2 and 4 and accompanying text (citing article and case supporting
proposition).
7 See FEINGOLD, supra note 2, at 286-89 (citing several contested arbitration issues).
8 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002). Section 10 of the FAA lays out the only four grounds pursuant to which an aggrieved party may challenge an arbitration decision or award. See id.
These grounds are as follows:
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The FAA provides limited grounds for seeking judicial review of an arbitrator's decision. 9 The Circuit Courts are currently split, however, as to
whether parties to an arbitration agreement may contract around the limited
judicial review standard under the FAA and instead open up the agreement
to further review by a court.' 0 The issue is important because allowing for
increased judicial review not only contradicts the Act's clearly established
scope, but also calls into question the practical viability of arbitration
agreements in the future." Allowing parties to open arbitration to extensive judicial review will change the arbitrator's
role and drastically alter
2
the courts' role in the arbitration process.1
This Note will advocate that parties should not be allowed to contract for expanded judicial review outside the FAA. The current disagreement among the Circuit Courts results from the Supreme Court's historical
approach to arbitration agreements vis-A-vis its mandate that they be interpreted as contracts between the parties.' 3 The Seventh, Eighth and Tenth
Circuit Courts opine that the federal policy favoring arbitration supersedes
any contractual elements of arbitration agreements, if such elements would
violate the provisions of, or policies behind, the FAA. 14 In contrast, the
Fifth and Ninth Circuit Courts hold that the contractual elements of individual arbitration agreements should survive, including clauses providing

(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means; (2)
where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them; (3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their
powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award
upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Id.
9 See id.
10 See Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline Co., 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001); UHC Mgt. Co.,
Inc. v. Computer Sci. Corp., 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998); Chi. Typographical Union v.
Chi. Sun-Times, Inc., 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991). See contra LaPine Tech. Corp. v.
Kyocera Corp., 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997); Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
1 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (noting federal policy favoring arbitration respects
process' integrity and independence).
12 See id. at 935-36 (noting potential burden on courts if required to review arbitration
proceedings and findings).
13 See Volt Info. Sci., Inc. v. Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S.
468, 474 (1989) (reemphasizing FAA's mandate to enforce arbitration agreements according to agreement terms).
14 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935 (noting judicial respect for arbitration agreements
compels courts to avoid substantive review); UHC Management, 148 F.3d at 997 (citing
clear review procedures laid out in FAA); Chi. Typographical, 935 F.2d at 1505 (holding
parties can not contract for judicial review other than under FAA prescriptions).
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for expanded judicial review, because of the Supreme Court's mandate that
the courts adhere to valid agreement terms. 15
II.

HISTORY

Congress enacted the FAA to compel the judiciary to enforce arbitration agreements.' 6 The Act mandates that where parties enter into
agreements to arbitrate, such agreements should be treated as independent
contracts and enforced according to the agreed upon terms. 17 Congress
specified the legal grounds and judicial procedures to be followed with
respect to a party's failure to arbitrate, a party's desire to compel arbitration, judicial power to vacate an arbitral
award, and judicial power to mod8
ify or correct an arbitral holding.
A.

ArbitrationAgreement as Contract

In accordance with the Act's mandate, federal courts consider arbitration agreements to be contracts and therefore construe them according to
contract law - subject to FAA provisions. 19 When the FAA is silent on an
issue, the courts regularly endorse special arbitration provisions commonly
formulated by parties that delineate the scope of the arbitrator's power, the
issues to be covered, proceeding formalities, and choice of law. 20 This
See LaPine Tech., 130 F.3d at 888 (citing Supreme Court's interpretation of arbitration agreements as contracts); Gateway Technologies, 64 F.3d at 996 (acknowledging
agreed upon judicial review clauses are in accord with Supreme Court arbitration jurisprudence).
16 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 474 (noting judicial reluctance to enforce arbitration agreements); Roadway Package Sys., Inc. v. Scott Kayser, 257 F.3d 287, 292 (3rd Cir. 2001)
(citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270 (1995)) (noting
previous judicial refusal to enforce arbitration agreements).
17 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002). The statute provides in pertinent part that, "an agreement in
writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id.; see also I.S. Joseph Co.,
Inc. v. Josco Crown Int'l, Ltd., 803 F.2d 396, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1986) (recognizing judicial
role as limited by four corners of arbitration agreement).
"8 9 U.S.C. §§ 3,4, 10, 11 (2002).
'9 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479 (recognizing contractual rights of parties within FAA
context); I.S. Joseph Co., 803 F.2d at 399 (noting judicial function to determine validity of
existing arbitration provisions in contracts); Bristol Farmers Mkt. and Auction Co. v. Arlen
Realty & Development Corp., 589 F.2d 1214, 1217 (3rd Cir. 1978) (noting limited role
courts play in interpreting arbitration provisions contained within contracts).
20 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (noting FAA's silence regarding choice of law leaves it to
parties' agreement); see also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (recognizing parties' freedom to structure arbitration agreements); I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. 803 F.2d at 399 (noting scope of arbitrator's power determined by parties' agreement). But see Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 257
F.3d at 289 (holding general choice of law provision not enough to eliminate FAA application).
15
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contractual freedom is limited, however, by the FAA's governing principles; and where agreed upon provisions contradict either the Act's words
or policies, they are not upheld.2 '
Because federal policy favors arbitration, courts hesitate to intercede in disputes governed by an arbitration agreement. 22 Where an arbitration provision exists, the court's involvement is limited to answering the
question of whether or not the arbitration provision in the contract is
valid.23 Courts will not consider substantive
issues within a contract if a
24
viable arbitration agreement exists.
B.

FederalPolicy FavoringArbitration

Congressional and judicial support for arbitration pursuant to the
FAA has led to a very low threshold of review under which the courts construe arbitration clauses broadly.25 The federal courts have fostered a
strong policy favoring arbitration agreements. 26 In most cases, federal
21

See Volt, 489 U.S. at 479. In Volt, the Supreme Court held that because there was

no "federal policy favoring arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules," presumably
because the FAA is silent on this point, parties could set out choice of law provisions in
their arbitration agreements. See id. at 476. The Court noted that enforcing these provisions "g[a]ve effect to the contractual rights and expectations of the parties, without doing
violence to the policies behind the FAA." Id. at 479.
22 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin MFG. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 402
(1967)
(asserting arbitration provisions should be evaluated separately from whole contract); Flender Corp. v. Techna-Quip Co., 953 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1992) (relying on Prima Paint
and deferring to arbitrator after finding valid arbitration provision).
23 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 404 (calling for strict judicial deference
towards
arbitration agreements). The preference for arbitration in a contract is so strong that courts
acknowledge the arbitrator's power to determine the validity of the very contract that provided for the arbitration in the first place, provided the arbitration provision was not entered
into fraudulently. See Flender, 953 F.2d at 277.
24 See Prima Paint, 388 U.S. at 394-95 (noting FAA's purpose to limit judicial intervention and expedite arbitration process); see also Flender, 953 F.2d at 277 (holding judicial involvement limited to arbitration provision's validity); I.S. Joseph Co., 803 F.2d at 399
(calling for strict deference to arbitral process where valid arbitration provision exists);
Bristol Farmers, 589 F.2d at 1217-18 (confining court's role to determination of whether
asserted issues are covered in agreement).
25 See U.S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 101 F.3d 813, 816 (2nd Cir. 1996)
(noting strong presumption of arbitrability); see also Flender, 953 F.2d at 278. "Arbitration
is an alternative to the judicial resolution of disputes, and an extremely low standard of
review is necessary to prevent arbitration from becoming merely an added preliminary step
to judicial resolution rather than a true resolution." Id. (quoting Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, Inc. v. Ellis, 849 F.2d 264, 267 (7th Cir. 1988)).
26 See Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983)
(noting federal law mandates arbitration questions decided in favor of arbitration); Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 643 (7th Cir. 1981). In Dickinson, the court
asserted, "the established federal policy that, when construing arbitration agreements, every
doubt is to be resolved in favor of arbitration." See Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 643.
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courts acknowledge the importance of arbitration by restricting their own
involvement and generally deferring to arbitrators. 27
C. JudicialReview of Arbitration Agreements Under the FAA
The FAA strictly curtails the level of review a court has over an arbitration agreement.28 Although federal courts may have jurisdiction over
the substantive disputes, the courts may not reach them if the parties previously agreed to settle these disputes through arbitration. Courts may only
review the agreement for questions of arbitrability and/or egregious violations by the arbitrator.:3 By deferring to the arbitrators' judgments in most
cases, courts reinforce the federal policy favoring arbitration and encourage parties to settle disputes without judicial involvement. 3 1 Furthermore,

in two recent cases, the Circuit Courts determined that arbitration agreements could serve to forfeit a party's right to litigation.

27

See Volt 489 U.S. at 475 (reasserting strong federal policy favoring arbitration);

Flender, 953 F.2d at 274 (noting low threshold of review prevents arbitration from becoming another step in litigation); Dickinson, 661 F.2d at 643 (stating "every doubt is to be
resolved in favor of arbitration."); see also Gait v. Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co., 376 F.2d
711, 714 (7th Cir. 1967) (highlighting FAA policy to enforce arbitration agreements and
"ease court congestion").
28 See Dickinson 661 F.2d at 645 (limiting permissible review of arbitration
agreements); Conticommodity Services, Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2nd Cir.
1980) (recognizing temptation of courts to go beyond permissible scope of review).
29 See Conticommodity, 613 F.2d at 1224 (noting courts violate FAA policies
by
reaching substantive issues).
o 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002). The FAA states that a court may review an award only if:
(1) ... the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (2) where
there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of them; (3)
where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct which prejudiced the rights of one
of the parties; or (4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.
Id. See also Volt, 489 U.S. at 480 (limiting court's role regarding arbitration agreements to
enforcement only).
3' See Volt, 489 U.S. at 474-76 (citing federal policy favoring arbitration); see also
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin MFG. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 (1967). In Prima
Paint, the Court noted "the unmistakably clear congressional purpose that the arbitration
procedure, when selected by the parties to a contract, be speedy and not subject to delay and
obstruction in the courts." Id.
32 See Sydnor v. Conseco Fin. Servicing, 252 F.3d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 2001). "[T/he
loss of the fight to a jury trial is a necessary and fairly obvious consequence of an agreement to arbitrate." Id. (quoting Pierson v. Dean, Witter Reynolds, Inc., 742 F.2d 334, 339
(7th Cir. 1984)); Burden v. Check Into Cash of Kentucky, LLC, 267 F.3d 483, 492 (6th Cir.
2001) (noting moving party must prove Congress intended certain litigation rights nonwaivable). But see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (holding certain
statutory claims are never waivable).
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Arbitration agreements are governed by contract law and therefore
are driven by the parties' intent. 33 Agreements can be broad or narrow,
vesting the arbitrator with a wide range of discretion. 34 In cases where
arbitrators have wide discretion, the court's role is strictly limited to the
terms laid out in the FAA. 5 In some cases, however, an arbitrator will
have narrow discretion. 36 In these situations, arbitrable issues and nonarbitrable issues will be linked together in the same case.37 The arbitrator
will be empowered to arbitrate certain narrow issues that the parties agree
to submit to arbitration, while other issues will lie outside of the arbitrator's power to decide. 8 In these situations, the courts will not review the
dispute as a whole and will leave arbitrable issues in the arbitrator's hands
before taking up any judicially reviewable issues. 39 Accordingly, narrowly
.

" See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (noting FAA's silence regarding choice of law leaves it to
parties' agreement); see also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (recognizing parties free to structure
arbitration agreements); I.S. Joseph Co., Inc. 803 F.2d at 399 (noting scope of arbitrator's
power determined by parties' agreement). But see Roadway PackageSys., Inc., 257 F.3d at
289 (holding general choice of law provision not enough to eliminate application of FAA).
See Flender Corp. v. Techna-Quip Co., 953 F.2d 273, 277 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating
broad arbitration clause may place question of contract validity within arbitrator's jurisdiction); see also Necchi v. Necchi Sewing Machine Sales Corp., 348 F.2d 693, 696 (2nd Cir.
1965) (stating some arbitration clauses can be so broad as to submit questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator).
35 See Necchi, 348 F.2d at 696. The court in Necchi noted that the breadth of the
arbitration agreement dictates how far a court may intercede in determining issues of arbitrability in the first instance. Id.
36 See Dean, Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 217-18 (arbitration agreement governing specific issues but not all issues of the claim).
37 Id. This case settled the circuit split regarding how to treat cases where arbitrable
and nonarbitrable issues (i.e., "intertwining issues") exist in the same case. Id. at 216-17.
The Ninth, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits employed the 'doctrine of intertwining' whereby
they tried all the issues in the same federal court, taking the case entirely out of arbitration.
Id. Conversely, the Sixth, Seventh and Eight Circuits bifurcated cases containing intertwining issues, leaving arbitrable issues out of federal jurisdiction and subject to arbitration. Id.
38 See Dean, Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 216-18 (noting intertwining issues
arising in same case).
9 See id. at 217-18. In settling the circuit split, this case mandated that where arbitrable and non-arbitrable issues exist in a contract, arbitration must be enforced. See id.
The Court stated "[b]y its terms, the Act leaves no place for the exercise of discretion by a
district court, but instead mandates that district courts shall direct the parties to proceed to
arbitration on issues as to which an arbitration agreement has been signed." Id. The Court
noted that despite the possible inefficiency of bifurcating the process, the federal policy
favoring arbitration dictates this result. Id. at 218; see also Flender,953 F.2d at 278 (asserting dissatisfied parties cannot bring arbitrable issues for review on merits); Bristol Farmers,
589 F.2d at 1221 (1978) (asserting parties cannot by-pass arbitration by claiming issues are
counterclaims to pending suit). But see Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42-54. In Alexander, the
Court took up a Title VII discrimination case that the lower courts refused to review because it had been ruled on in arbitration proceedings. See id. The Supreme Court's opinion
was careful to note that the Title VII claim had an independent statutory claim separate
from the contractual claim provided for in the arbitration agreement and that as such, it was
subject to judicial remedy. See id. The Court was clear that by reviewing the issue it was
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constructed arbitration clauses can not be used as a ruse to submit the en40
tire agreement to judicial review.
III. FACTS
The federal policy favoring arbitration was recently challenged by
cases in which the parties included a provision for expanded judicial review in the arbitration agreements. 4 1 These provisions allowed for judicial
review of the arbitration agreement on grounds not mentioned in the
42
FAA.
The parties agreed that in the event one party believed the evidence did not support the arbitrator's decision, or in the event that the arbitrator committed an error of law, the arbitration could be appealed in a
court of law.43 The parties laid out these grounds for review; they are not
valid bases for review under the FAA.44 The central disagreement among
the circuit courts is whether to enforce these provisions as contractual elements pursuant to past Supreme Court mandates, or whether to invalidate
them as contradicting the FAA's clearly established judicial review provisions 45
.
The Tenth Circuit was the most recent court to analyze this issue in
Bowen v. Amoco Pipeline CO. 4 6 In Bowen, the arbitration provision in
question stated that the parties had "the right to appeal any arbitration
award to the district court 'on the grounds that the award is not supported
by the evidence."' 47 The Tenth Circuit ruled that allowing parties to connot effectively giving the petitioner a chance to review the arbitrator's holding, but was
affording the petitioner a forum for his valid and independent statutory claim. Id.
40 See Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 470 U.S. at 217 (requiring district courts to compel
arbitration); see also Flender, 953 F.2d at 278 (noting parties may not bring actions to review arbitrator's discretion as a ruse for substantive review) (quoting Burkart Randall v.
Lodge No. 1076, 648 F.2d 462, 467 (7th Cir. 1981)).
41 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930 (agreeing to appeal where decision not supported by
evidence); LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887 (agreeing to appeal where findings not supported by
substantial evidence); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995 (agreeing to appeal where arbitrator commits error of law).

See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930; LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995.
But see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) (laying out grounds for arbitration review).
43 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 930; LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887-89; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995.
44 See 9 U.S.C. § 10; see also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 932 (citing FAA's strict review
procedures).
45 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-35 (stating parties not free to dictate appeal process);
UHC Mgt. Co., Inc., 148 F.3d at 998 (stating no authority grants parties power to dictate
appeal process); Chi. Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1504-06 (asserting parties can not
create jurisdiction by contract). See contra LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (citing importance of
enforcing private agreements); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996-97 (holding contractual provisions
supplement FAA procedure).
46 254 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2001).
47 254 F.3d at 930. The parties went on to agree that the ruling of the district court
would be final. Id. The court found this provision to be lacking in substance, however,
42
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tract for expanded judicial review contradicts the FAA's intention and
policies, places courts in an awkward position not contemplated by the
FAA, and interferes with the judicial process.48
The court held that in entering into arbitration agreements, the parties make an informed trade of judicial review in favor of arbitration,
which is simpler and more expedient. 49 The court explained that considering the nature of arbitration, Congress provided a limited basis for judicial
review under the FAA, thereby preventing arbitration proceedings from
dragging on and ensuring the integrity of the arbitration process itself.50
The Bowen court noted that the FAA also intended to preserve the independent nature of arbitration. 5' Specifically, FAA provisions requiring
courts to enforce arbitration agreements and final arbitration decisions
would be wholly contradicted if courts were allowed to review issues after
an arbitrator's ruling.52
The Bowen court was also concerned that judicial review of arbitration proceedings would place an undue burden on courts unfamiliar with
the rules and procedures of arbitration. 53 In addition, the independent nature of arbitrators would be threatened if they were forced to issue written
opinions defending their decisions: arbitrators would then be concerning
themselves with the potential of judicial review instead of freely formulating original solutions. The Bowen court understood that these issues di-

because all final determinations of a district court are reviewable by appellate courts pursuant to their jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. In theory, the arbitration provision in
question could be appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. See id.
48 Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934-35. "The FAA's limited review ensures judicial respect
for the arbitration process and prevents courts from enforcing parties' agreements to arbitrate only to refuse to respect the results of the arbitration." Id.
49 Id. (stating proposition that arbitration trades formalities of litigation and judicial
review).
50 Id. The court also noted the absurdity of requiring courts to enforce arbitration
agreements if they retained power to overturn these decisions. Id.
51 See Bowen 254 F.3d. at 935 (stating FAA's purpose to preserve independent arbitration).
52 See id. at 935. The court decided that "contractually expanded standards, particularly those that allow for factual review, clearly threaten to undermine the independence of
the arbitration process and dilute the finality of the arbitration award .....Id.
53 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935-36 (noting line between arbitration and litigation
would be blurred if judicial review interfered); see also UHC Mgmt. Co., 148 F.3d at 998.
"We have served notice 'that where arbitration is contemplated the courts are not equipped
to provide the same judicial review given to structured judgments defined by procedural
rules and legal principles. Parties should be aware that they get what they bargain for and
that arbitration is far different from adjudication."' Id. (quoting Stroh Container Co. v.
Delphi Indus., Inc., 783 F.2d 743, 751 n.12 (8th Cir. 1986)).
54 See Bowen, 254 F.3d at 935-36 (noting sacrifice of simplicity, expediency and
cost-effectiveness with requiring written opinions).
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rectly contradicted the policies of arbitral autonomy and judicial noninterference that underlie the FAA.55
Finally, the Bowen court displayed concern with potential interference in the judicial process. 56 Although the court acknowledged that parties are free to structure agreements and are even free even to make choice
of law determinations within their arbitration proceedings, "no authority
clearly allows private parties to determine how federal courts review arbitration agreements. '57 In essence, deference to the agreement of parties
must stop short of violating the FAA and the judicial process. 58 The court
asserted that by enacting the FAA, Congress did not vest courts with independent jurisdiction pursuant to Congress' Article II power but instead
created a statutory scheme to guide and govern arbitration agreements.59
By asserting that parties to an arbitration agreement can not dictate
federal jurisdiction, the Bowen court echoed a previous holding in the Seventh Circuit and an assertion made in dicta by the Eighth Circuit. 6° In Chicago Typographical Union v. Chicago Sun-Times, Inc.61 the Seventh Circuit clearly asserted, "federal jurisdiction cannot be created by contract. 62
The court cited the FAA's provisions as the only feasible means by which
a federal court may review an arbitration award.63 The Seventh Circuit
pointed out that even if parties could not obtain federal judicial review,
they were free to contract for an appellate arbitration panel to review the
award. 64

" See id.
56

See id. at 934 (noting parties can not dictate federal judicial jurisdiction).

57 Id. Indeed, the court went on to say: "to the contrary, through the FAA Congress

has provided explicit guidance regarding judicial standards of review of arbitration awards."
Id.
58 See id. at 934-35 (distinguishing case from Volt). The Bowen court acknowledged
the Supreme Court's holding in Volt, but differentiated the case at hand by stating that the
FAA is in fact not silent on the issue of judicial review, but is in fact quite clear, whereas
choice of law is not mentioned within the Act. Id.
59 Id. at 931-32. The court noted that the FAA's review scheme is "among the narrowest known to the law." Id. at 932 (quoting ARW Exploration Corp. v. Aguirre, 45 F.3d
1455, 1462 (10th Cir. 1997)).
60 See Chi. Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1504-05 (noting "federal jurisdiction
can not be created by contract"); UHC Mgmt. Co., 148 F.3d at 994-96 (FAA not a source of
jurisdiction, but a set of procedures).
61 935 F.2d 1501 (7th Cir. 1991).
62 See Chi. Typographical Union, 935 F.2d at 1505.
63 Id. In addition, the court noted that courts are not allowed to look into the substantive findings of an arbitrator, even where the court may disagree with an arbitrator's findings. Id. But see Pike v. Freeman, 266 F.3d 78, 86 (2nd Cir. 2001). In Pike, the court
noted that an arbitrator's decision may be vacated if the arbitrator has shown "manifest
disregard of the law." Id.
64 See Chi. Typographical,935 F.2d at 1505 (stating proposition).
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Similarly, in UHC Management Co., Inc. v. Computer Sciences
Corp.,65 the Eighth Circuit stated in dicta that parties are not free to contract for expanded judicial review where Congress clearly limited the instances in which judicial review is available. 66 Like the Bowen court, the
Eighth Circuit recognized the Supreme Court's holding in Volt Information
67
Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University,

in which the Court held that parties may include choice of law provisions
in their arbitration agreements. 68 Both the UHC Management and Bowen
decisions were careful to distinguish choice of law provisions from provisions that directly contradict the FAA mandates and interfere with the
Act's limited review scheme. 69 The Eighth Circuit cautioned against enforcing a contract between two parties when doing so contradicts the clear
statutory scheme laid out in the FAA. 70 Although this statement was not
incorporated into the case's final holding, it clearly indicates the Eighth
Circuit's opinion of judicial review of arbitration agreements. 7'
On the other side of the circuit split are two cases decided within the
past seven years, in which the Fifth and Ninth Circuits held that parties to
an arbitration agreement can in fact contract for expanded judicial review. 72 In Gateway Technologies, Inc. v. MCI Telecommunications
Corp.,7 3 the Fifth Circuit held that a clause in the arbitration agreement
providing for judicial review of any "errors of law" committed by the arbitrator was valid and enforceable.7 4 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit came to the

65 148 F.3d 992 (8th Cir. 1998).
66

See UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997. The Eighth Circuit stated plainly, "we do not

believe it is yet a foregone conclusion that parties may effectively agree to compel a federal
court to cast aside sections 9, 10 and II of the FAA." Id.
67 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
68 UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997 (agreeing with Volt, but distinguishing case at hand);
see also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (disagreeing with holdings of other circuit courts on this
issue).
69 See UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997. The court in UHC Mgmt. stated that though
parties may choose a particular state's law to govern their arbitration agreement, "[i]t is not
clear, however, that parties have any say in how a federal court will review an arbitration
award when Congress has ordained a specific, self-limiting procedure for how such a review is to occur." Id.; see also Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934 (stating that Supreme Court has
never said parties may interfere with judicial process).
70 See UHC Mgmt., 148 F.3d at 997 (noting the clearly spelled out review provisions
of FAA).
71 See id. at 998 (leaving question unresolved until "time when circumstances require
[resolution]").
72 See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887 (allowing agreement to appeal where findings not
supported by substantial evidence); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995 (allowing agreement to appeal
where arbitrator commits error of law).
7' 64 F.3d 993 (5th Cir. 1995).
74 See Gateway, 64 F.3d at 995-97 (holding parties free to agree to judicial review
terms not contemplated in FAA).
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same conclusion in LaPine Technology Corp. v. Kyocera Corp.75 In LaPine, the parties had agreed that an arbitrated decision could be reviewed
where that decision was not "supported by substantial evidence, or where
the Tribunal's conclusions of law are erroneous. 76
Gateway and LaPine relied heavily on the Supreme Court's holding
in Volt.77 The essence of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt was that
parties to an arbitration agreement may contract choice of law issues, even
if it would remove the agreement from the FAA's jurisdiction. 78 The Supreme Court reinforced the strong federal policy favoring arbitration, but
noted that the federal policy does not promote arbitration governed by one
set of rules over another. 79 There is no provision in the FAA regarding
choice of law issues. 80 The Supreme Court, however, held that the choice
of law agreement did not "do violence to the policies behind the FAA" and
could therefore be enforced. 8'
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits interpreted Volt to mean that all agreed
upon provisions in an arbitration agreement should be enforced. 82 In accordance with Volt, the courts in LaPine and Gateway held that the FAA's
foremost goal is to uphold the contract between the parties and all provisions therein. 3 The Fifth and Ninth Circuits held that a logical extension
of the holding in Volt would also apply to judicial review clauses.84 By

71 130 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1997).
76

See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 887 (describing parties' agreement). The court in LaPine

went on to hold that the importance of respecting the parties' agreement required allowing
the expanded review provisions. Id. at 888. The court relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Volt in reaching this decision. Id.
77 See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (interpreting Volt as requiring strict adherence to
parties' agreement); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 997 (holding federal arbitration policy to require
adherence to parties' agreement).
78 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79. Indeed, the Court noted that even if state law dictated suspension of the arbitration proceedings, whereas the FAA would permit arbitration
to go forward, the state law should be respected if the parties chose to submit their agreement to that state's law. See id.
79 See Volt, 489 U.S. at 476 (noting silence of FAA on choice of law issue).
80 See id.
81 See id. at 479 (noting consistency between parties' agreement and FAA policies).
82 See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (correlating FAA policies with enforcement of all
agreement terms); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (noting arbitration as creature of contract). But
see Bowen, 254 F.3d at 934. In Bowen, the court disagreed with the LaPine and Gateway
courts in finding that the main thrust of the Volt decision was that all contractually agreed
upon terms not violating the underlying policies of the FAA should be enforced and those
contravening the intention of the FAA should be excluded. See id.
83 See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (noting Congress principally intended FAA to enforce
arbitration contracts); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79).
84 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (noting difference between LaPine,
Gateway holdings versus holding in Bowen).
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analogy, courts should enforce agreements for judicial review just as the
85
Supreme Court enforced the parties' agreement for choice of law in Volt.
IV. ANALYSIS
The current circuit split over expanded judicial review boils down
to different interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision in Volt and the
policies behind the FAA. 6 The Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth circuits assert
that the Supreme Court's intention in Volt was not to call for strict contractual interpretation and enforcement of arbitration proceedings.8 7 Instead,
they argue that Volt called on courts to review the disputed provision to
determine if it is in accordance with the FAA's policies. 88 If such provision does not "do violence to the policies of the FAA," then it should be
enforced.89
The Fifth and Ninth Circuits concede that the Supreme Court's intention in Volt was to preserve the FAA's policies, but these circuits assert
that the most important FAA policy is the strict judicial enforcement of
arbitration contracts. 9° These circuits find the contractual element of arbitration more compelling than other FAA mandates, and this interpretation
would allow parties to agree to terms not mentioned in the FAA even
where the terms do not comport with the Act's clear mandates. 9'
The Bowen court had a more expansive reading of Volt and one that
is more in line with Congress' intent in passing the FAA.92 Stating that the
federal policy toward arbitration does not favor the application of one set
of rules over another, the Court in Volt effectively stated that where the
" See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (holding courts should enforce judicial review
clauses); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (holding judicial review terms in agreement prevail over
FAA mandates). But see LaPine, 130 F.3d at 891 (Mayer, J., dissenting). Justice Mayer
noted the jurisdictional problem necessitated by the majority's holding. Id. That is, "Kyocera cites no authority explicitly empowering litigants to dictate how an Article III court
must review an arbitration decision." Id.

86 See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888 (noting Congress principally intended FAA to enforce
arbitration contracts); Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996 (citing Volt, 489 U.S. at 478-79). These

courts determined that Volt stood for the principle that parties' agreement overrides FAA
prescriptions. See LaPine, 130 F.3d at 888; Gateway, 64 F.3d at 996.
87 See supra notes 60, 68 and 69 and accompanying text (noting problem of expanding judicial review).
8 See supra notes 60, 66 and 69 and accompanying text (noting federal policy favoring arbitration does not allow private parties to dictate federal judicial jurisdiction).
89 See supra notes 21, 52 and 57 and accompanying text (citing cases stating proposition).
90 See supra notes 76-77, 82-83 and accompanying text (asserting federal policy
favoring arbitration dictates adherence to parties' agreement).
91 See supra notes 76, 85 and accompanying text (reinforcing overarching contractual
nature of arbitration agreements).
92 See supra notes 48, 52, 59 and accompanying text (noting the narrow judicial review provisions of FAA).
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FAA is silent on certain issues, i.e. choice of law, the parties are free to
contract as they wish.93 This holding respects the FAA's parameters by not
violating any of its specific mandates.94 Another effect of the holding is to
reinforce the independent nature of arbitration and the freedom parties enjoy in contracting for arbitration proceedings.95 The Court, however, did
not say that parties were free to contract regarding any and all arbitration
provisions.96 The Court clearly stated that in allowing parties to insert
choice of law provisions into their arbitration agreements, parties would
not be violating the policies behind the FAA.97
The clear intention of expanded judicial review clauses is to override the limited review provided under the FAA and should therefore be
considered a violation of the FAA.98 It is a reasonable inference that where
the Court was concerned with violating the policies behind the FAA they
would likewise not favor contractual provisions that would violate the specific directives of the statutory scheme. 99
The FAA provisions call on courts to interpret and enforce arbitration agreements as contracts. 1 ° However it must be pointed out that the
FAA is still a statutory scheme, with specific applications and rules for
handling the enforcement and review of arbitration agreements and holdings.' ° 1 Congress stated in the FAA that contract law is the tool of interpretation for courts in looking at arbitration provisions. 0 2 Contract law is
not, however, the source from which arbitration agreements derive their
validity under federal law. 10 3 Instead, the source of federal arbitration law
is the FAA itself.'04 Contract law is merely a source that courts may rely on
where the FAA is silent and parties have contracted in good faith.' °5 The
93 See supra notes 20-21, 79 and accompanying text (observing silence of FAA on
choice of law issues).
94 See supra notes 21, 81 and accompanying text (holding need for symmetry between FAA policies and parties' agreement).
95 See supra notes 27, 52 and accompanying text (cases noting independent and
unique nature of arbitration compared to litigation).
96 See supra notes 21, 79 and accompanying text (Volt decision notes FAA's silence
on choice of law issues, leaving it up to parties agreement).
97 See supra note 21 and accompanying text (case stating proposition).
98 See supra notes 45-57 and accompanying text (citing problems attendant on allowing parties to dictate federal jurisdiction).
99 See supra notes 11, 21, 50-52 and accompanying text (citing federal policy favoring arbitration and noting contradiction of allowing parties to contract around FAA).
1oo See supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing FAA).
101 See supra notes 3, 8 and 17 and accompanying text (citing to specific statutory
provisions of FAA).
102 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (citing § 2 of FAA calling for arbitration
agreements to have same force and effect as all contracts).
103See supra note 3 (citing specific U.S.C. provisions embodying FAA).
104 See supra note 3.

10- See supra notes 13, 17, 19 and accompanying text (noting federal judicial treatment

of arbitration agreements as contracts).
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explicit FAA provisions should always override agreements between parties that violate the FAA, including expanded judicial review. °6
Congress wanted to protect the independence of the arbitration
process in crafting the FAA.10 7 Under the FAA, federal courts should only
be involved in the arbitration process at two points in time: initially in
bringing parties into arbitration and at the end to enforce the arbitrator's
official decision.1°8 Other judicial involvement is strictly curtailed under
the FAA, which allows arbitration to prevail on its own merits and be used
by parties as a truly independent source of non-judicial dispute resolution.'('9 To allow parties to bring arbitrated disputes into federal court on
appeal would weaken the arbitration process and further burden courts with
cases they would not normally hear." 0 The arbitration process would be
weakened because the findings of arbitrators would no longer have a binding and final quality."' Inevitably, the losing party would seek an appeal
and arbitration would become2 a first step in litigation, rather than an expedient decision-making tool."
V.

CONCLUSION

Since Congress enacted the FAA in 1925, arbitration agreements
have become a common and useful tool in resolving disputes outside of
traditional litigation. The reason that arbitration continues to flourish as an
alternative dispute resolution method is largely due to the FAA and the
statutory protections it affords. The FAA ensures the independence of
arbitration by curtailing the intervention of federal courts into such disputes and by calling on courts to enforce arbitration.
Through the FAA, Congress developed a scheme whereby courts, in
reviewing arbitration agreements, remain outside the agreements and do
not reach the case's merits except in extreme cases. This neutrality was
ensured by the FAA mandate for courts to interpret arbitration agreements
106 See supra notes 48, 50, 57, 59 and accompanying text (cases citing clear and nar-

row focus of FAA judicial review scheme).
107 See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (noting Bowen court's focus on
independent arbitration process).
108 See supra notes 8, 17 and accompanying text (FAA provisions requiring judicial
enforcement and laying out conditions for judicial review).
109 See supra notes 23-25 and accompanying text (cases citing strong preference for
independent arbitration process and judicial non-interference).
110 See supra notes 12, 53, 85 and accompanying text (cases noting jurisdictional, as
well as procedural issues involved with expanded judicial review).
1 See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text (cases stating that when parties
submit to arbitration, they trade the formalities and review procedures of litigation).
12 See supra notes 25, 47, 54 and accompanying text (cases noting importance of
distinguishing arbitration from traditional litigation).
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as contracts and to interpret them according to the FAA and the parties'
terms. In Volt, the Supreme Court illustrated a roadmap for navigating the
FAA. Essentially, where the FAA is silent on an issue -- choice of law, for
example, parties will be free to contract that issue and will be able to
choose what law will govern their agreement. Parties may not, however,
contract where such agreements would violate the FAA's provisions and
the policies behind it. It is therefore clear that judicial review clauses that
allow parties to circumscribe the FAA's clear statutory scheme should not
be enforced.
Judicial review clauses do more than violate the FAA. In allowing
parties to appeal arbitral decisions, the essential nature of arbitration is
weakened. Arbitration will no longer be an independent and binding tool
of dispute resolution, but will become the first step in a potentially lengthy
litigation process. This outcome was not the intention of the FAA's drafters, it is not the Supreme Court's intention, and it should not be the reality
of arbitration agreements in the future.
Julie E. Patalano

